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TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-THE CONSTRUCTION OF
SECTION 2036-Among the more serious problems facing the estate
planner is the question of how the various inter vivos transfers of
property which a client may make while retaining some form of
interest himself will be treated for federal estate tax purposes. The
heart of this problem is section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 which is designed to reach, generally, those interests in
property retained by a decedent for the balance of his life.1 The
section provides:
"(a) General Rule-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property ... to the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer . . . , by trust or otherwise, under which he has
retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in
fact end before his death(1) the' possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the
income from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any
person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy
the property or the income therefrom." 2
Like other sections of the Code which define includibility, section
2036 is directed at traditional concepts of property interests. Thus,
property transferred in fee by the decedent with the reservation of
a life estate for himself is clearly to be included in his gross estate
under section 2036; the value of an inter vivos trust from which
the settlor reserves income for life is similarly includible.3 While
1 The types of property interests which are includible in the decedent's gross estate
are defined by !NT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 2033-42. Section 2033 is the general provision
which includes all property of the decedent to the extent of his interest at death. The
other provisions make includible certain specific properties: § 2034--dower and curtesy
interests, § 2035-transactions in contemplation of death, § 2036-life estates, § 2037transfers taking effect at death where decedent has a 5% reversionary interest, § 2038revocable transfers, § 2039-annuities, § 2040-joint interests, § 2041-powers of
appointment, and § 2042-life insurance policies.
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
a Treas. Reg. § 20.2036·1 (1958).
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section 2036 can be applied without question to these historical
property interests, it is not so clear that it can or should be applied
to such diverse property relationships as crossed trusts, survivorship annuities, trusts to satisfy legal obligations, powers to allocate
trust funds between principal and income beneficiaries, or combined annuity-life insurance policies. If these property arrangements are to be included in the gross estate of a decedent, they
must be analogized to the traditional life estate. A failure so to
analogize them must have the effect of freeing these interests from
federal estate tax because section 2036 contains the only general
description which could encompass such arrangements. 4
Recent decisions demonstrate that the courts have not been
able to agree upon the intended scope of this key section. FidelityPhiladelphia Trust Co. v. Smith5 is an excellent illustration of
this problem. In this case the decedent purchased three life
insurance policies although she had reached an age at which she
had become uninsurable. The policies were issued without a
medical examination upon condition that decedent purchase in
addition three annuities for her life.6 At all times the insurer
treated the arrangements as separate contracts. Decedent transferred the policies irrevocably to the beneficiarie~ and paid the
gift tax. The Third Circuit reasoned that such an arrangement
was equivalent to the decedent's setting up a trust for herself for
life, remainder over,7 and held the value of the insurance policies
includible in decedent's gross estate under section 2036.
However, the Supreme Court reversed on appeal and held that
the arrangement involved two distinct transactions. Since neither
of the transactions individually constituted an arrangement subject
4 Section 2036 is the only provision in the Code which deals with the includibility
of property interests measured by the life of the transferor. Thus if property interests
which exist for the life of the decedent-transferor are not reached under § 2036, these
interests will not be included in his gross estate. See note l supra.
5 356 U.S. 274 (1958), 56 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1366.
6 The Court found that because the total amount of the premiums for both the
annuities and the life policies was great enough to generate more than the required
interest to make the annuity payments and was great enough to pay the face value of
the life insurance policies, the company incurred no monetary risk by writing the
policies. However, if the beneficiaries had surrendered their policies for their cash
surrender value, it is doubtful that the fund remaining would have been sufficient to
pay the annuity over a substantial period of time. See Note, 42 CoLUM. L. REv. 162
(1942).
7 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 241 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1957).
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to estate tax liability,8 the decedent had not created relationships
which would subject her estate to the payment of the tax.
The Fidelity-Philadelphia decision decided the narrow problem of the application of section 2036 to the single-premium
combined annuity-life insurance policy situation.9 But the decision
was greeted by many as one based on the form of the relationship
rather than the substance of the property interests which in fact
existed. 1O Because of the criticism of this decision as a deviation
from the purpose for which section 2036 had been adopted, it
seems appropriate to look at the intent which Congress manifested
when the forerunners of section 2036 were enacted.
This comment will explore two problems: first, an analysis of
the legislative history of the present section 2036 in an effort to
discover exactly which property relationships Congress intended
to reach by this provision; second, an examination of the treatment
which several specific arrangements have been given by the courts
to determine whether there is any degree of certainty or predictability in the application of section 2036.
J.

THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF SECTION

2036

The first federal estate tax was passed as part of the Revenue
Act of 1916.11 The tax was imposed on the net estate of every
8 The annuity was not taxable since the decedent had no interest in the property at
the time of his death. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2035(a). The value of the insurance
policy is excluded because decedent retained no incidents of its ownership. INT. R.Ev.
CoDE OF 1954, § 2042(2).
9 Before the decision of the Fidelity-Philadelphia case, the federal circuits had been
divided on whether to apply § 2036 to the single premium combination annuity-life
insurance policy circumstance. The Sixth, Second and Ninth Circuits had held the
property interest taxable on the theory decedent had carried out a single transaction,
which was in substance equivalent to a life trust. Conway v. Glenn, 193 F.2d 965 (6th
Cir. 1952); Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1946); Commissioner v. Clise,
122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 821 (1942). The Seventh Circuit in
Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1952), held such an arrangement was not
taxable since it involved two transactions. The Bohnen case was affirmed by an equally
divided court, 345 U.S. 946 (1953). To decide the Fidelity-Philadelphia case it was also
necessary for the Court to distinguish Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941). That
case was factually similar to the Fidelity-Philadelphia case except the decedent had
retained the incidents of ownership of the insurance policy. However, the grounds for
that decision were not that the arrangement was taxable as insurance, but that it did not
constitute an insurance risk and was therefore taxable only under § 2036. 312 U.S. at
540.
10 See, e.g., 72 HARV. L. R.Ev. 109 (1958); 1958 u. ILL. L.F. 480; 56 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1366
(1958); 43 MINN. L. R.Ev. 354 (1958). See generally Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity
Contracts Under Estate and Inheritance Taxes, 39 MICH. L. R.Ev. 856 (1941).
11 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 1-901, 39 Stat. 756.
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decedent. 12 The value of a decedent's gross estate was to include,
according to section 202 (b) , "a transfer ... intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after his death." 13 The committee
reports in neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate
indicate any elaboration of the terms used in the statute itself. The
sole concern of the Congress seemed to be with the need to increase
revenues in the face of world events in 1916.14 The imposition of
an estate tax was looked upon as one solution to this problem. A
few decisions were handed down interpreting the meaning of
section 202 (b) , but these did little to modify what seemed to be
the plain meaning of the statute. In Shukert v. Allen15 the
decedent with a life expectancy of sixteen years set up a trust, in
which he retained no beneficial interest, to accumulate income for
thirty years. The Court held that the managerial interest-as
opposed to beneficial interest-did not make the trust includible
in decedent's gross estate. In Nichols v. Coolidge16 the decedent
had created a trust for herself for life, with the corpus over after
her death. In 1917 she had assigned her life interest to the holder
of the remainder. The Court held that the decedent's interest in
the trust was not includible in her gross estate. The conclusion,
however, was reached solely on the ground that the trust was
created before the enactment of the statute. Two trusts were
involved in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.17 The first trust to A
and then on the death of the decedent-settlor to B was held nontaxable, while a second trust to the decedent for life with a power
of revocation, remainder over to B, was held to be includible in the
gross estate of the decedent. None of these cases attempted to
define broadly the scope of section 202 (b) ; but it was generally
assumed that the simple case of a trust with income to decedent
for life and remainder over would be includible in the gross estate
for federal estate tax purposes.
In 1930, however, the Supreme Court handed down its famous
decision of May v. Heiner. 18 In that case, the decedent had created
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 201, 39 Stat. 777.
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 777.
H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1916). ·
273 U.S. 545 (1927). See generally LOWNDES 8: KRAMER, THE
ch. 8 (1956).
16 274 U.S. 531 (1927).
17 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
1s 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
12
13
14
15

EsTATE AND

GIFr TAX
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a trust for herself for life, then to her husband for his life, the
corpus over on the death of both. The Court reasoned that the
transfer took place not at death but at the time of the execution
of the trust agreement. The thought that May v. Heiner could
be distinguished because of the intervening life estate was dispelled
a year later when the Court handed down three per curiam
opinions holding that a trust for the decedent-settlor for life,
corpus over, was not includible in the decedent's gross estate.19
The day following these per curiam decisions, Congress passed
the Joint Resolution of March 3, 193!2° (the forerunner of section
2036) aimed at correcting the problem of the Heiner case.
Discussion on the floor of Congress indicated that Congress had
thought since the passage of the 1916 act that the life trust had
been taxable under the provisions of that act.21 It is also apparent
from the reports that the urgency of the action of Congress was
caused solely by the possible loss of revenue to the government if
life trusts continued to be outside the reach of the federal estate
tax. 22 The discussion of this resolution contains nothing which
would indicate that Congress intended to do more than simply
make includible in the decedent's gross estate a trust giving the
decedent the income for his life. Section 803 of the Revenue Act
of 1932 23 took the changes of the joint resolution and attempted to
19 Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931); Mersman v. Burnet, 283 U.S.
783 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931).
20 " ••• a transfer under which the transferor has retained for his life or any period
not ending before his death (I) the possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the
property or (2) the right to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or the income therefrom." Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, 46 Stat. 1516.
21 Mr. Smoot: "It had generally been considered that this provision of the statute
covered cases such as those referred to above. The Treasury Department had so contrued
the statute since the first Federal estate tax law in 1916 and its regulations so provide.
If, for example, the owner of property transferred the title to his house to a trustee
for the benefit of his children after his death, but in the meantime reserved the use,
income and enjoyment of the house to himself during his own lifetime, it was supposed
that the value of the property at the date of his death should be included in his estate
for purposes of the estate tax. Under the decisions rendered yesterday, the property
would not be included in computing the Federal estate tax.
"It is entirely apparent that if this situation is permitted to continue, the Federal
estate tax will be seriously affected.••• It is of the greatest importance, therefore, that
this situation be corrected and that this obvious opportunity for tax avoidance be
removed. It is for that purpose that the joint resolution is proposed." 74 CONG. REc.
7078 (1931).
22 74 CoNG. REc. 7198 (letter of Ogden L. Mills, Acting Secretary of the Treasury
and discussion thereof).
23 Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 803, 47 Stat. 279.
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clarify them and put them in context in the law.24 In addition the
1932 act added the words "or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death" to make includible a trust where
income was payable to the decedent only to the last payment period
before his death. Prior to 1932, since any income accrued during
the last interest period was not to be paid to him or to his estate,
he had been held not to have retained a trust for his life.25 Also
added by the 1932 act was a provision dealing with concurrence in
the right to designate income beneficiaries. 26 The committee reports also indicate that two clarifying changes were made by the
1932 act,27 but the act in general was not designed to broaden the
scope of the joint resolution. There is nothing in the committee
reports which would support an inference that Congress was
concerned with a broader application of the statute than to
encompass life trusts. No significant changes have been made in
the substance of section 2036 since the Act of 1932.
It must be noted that it is possible to interpret the language of
section 2036 broadly enough to encompass many other types of
property arrangements, especially when the courts are willing to
consider the substance rather than the form of the interests created.
The fact remains that in the light of the history of the section an
intent of Congress to go farther than merely to include a simple
trust arrangement in the decedent's gross cannot be established.
The large number of other types of property arrangements which
have been found to be within the scope of section 2036 have been
put there by the process of judicial interpretation. Even if the
legitimacy of an expanded construction of the statute is granted,
the courts, nevertheless, have been inconsistent in its application.

II.

THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION

2036

The application of section 2036 to varying fact situations
provides no degree of certainty or predictability. The courts seem
rather to have adopted an ad hoc approach in their interpretation
of the statute. In construing section 2036 the courts have been
forced to consider, under a provision intended to encompass only
H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1932).
H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1932).
Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 803(a), 47 Stat. 279; H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 47 (1932).
27 H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1932).
24
25
26
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life estates in the historic sense of that word, property interests
which could not have been held taxable under any other section.
If an expanded construction is to be given section 2036, it should
be applied consistently to basically similar property interests,
which should be included in the decedent's gross estate only if
they closely parallel the historic life estate.
In the Fidelity-Philadelphia case, discussed at the outset,28 the
Court did not take account of the substance of the interests created
and held that section 2036 was inapplicable. Contrast this with
the treatment given section 2036 in State Street Trust Co. v.
United States. 29 There the decedent created a trust with himself
as trustee, retaining only broad investment powers. He retained
no income for himself and no specific power to appoint the income.
The First Circuit, however, reasoned that because his power over
investments was broad enough to make allocations between principal and income, he had retained the power to determine the
beneficial enjoyment of the income from the trust. As a result of
the property interests created, the decedent in Fidelity-Philadelphia received beneficial enjoyment of a life income, while the
trustee in State Street Trust had no beneficial enjoyment. Yet
no tax was suffered by the estate in Fidelity-Philadelphia, while in
the State Street case the trust was included in the decedent's gross
estate. If we are to distinguish between the two cases, it would
seem more logical to tax the property transfer which gave the
decedent a beneficial interest.
The application of section 2036 in the area of crossed trusts is
illustrative of the same basic confusion. In Lehman v. Commissioner,30 two brothers created trusts for one another. The trust
which named the first brother to die as its income beneficiary was
held includible in his gross estate even though it had been created
(transferred) by the surviving brother. The Court found that one
trust served as the quid pro quo for the other and so the interest
created was the same as if decedent had created the trust for
himself. In McLain v. ]arecki31 decedent set up a trust to accumulate income until his death; then this income was to be paid to his
28 See text at p. 6!12 supra.
29 26!! F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1959), 45 CORNELL L.Q. 598 (1960). See Gray and Covey,
State Street-A Case Study of Sections 20!J6(a)(2) and 2038, 15 TAX L. REv. 75 (1959).
80 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940).
81 2!12 F.2d 2ll (7th Cir. 1956).
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wife for life, remainder over to his daughter. His wife set up a
similar trust with an accumulation of income until her death, and
she named decedent income beneficiary for his life. Despite the
fact that the instruments were drawn at the same time by the same
lawyer, the Court concluded that one trust was not the consideration for the other and held the trust in question was not includible
in the decedent's gross estate. Some courts have adopted the
reasoning of the McLain case and have concluded that a mere
"unity of action" in the establishment of trusts is not proof of
consideration, and trusts thus created are not subject to federal
estate tax. 32 At least one court, however, has held that consideration can be presumed from the creation of crossed trusts. 33 Crossed
trusts, because of the beneficial enjoyment of the decedent, would
seem to be logically includible under section 2036.
Section 2036 faces uncertain application as well in the area of
discretionary trusts. In Commissioner v. Irving Trust Co.34 the
decedent set up a trust to pay his ex-wife a monthly income of $150.
The balance of income was to be paid to the decedent. The trustee
had the power to refund to the settlor the corpus of the trust so
long as enough remained to pay the ex-wife her monthly income.
Decedent received enough back from the trustee at his request to
establish a similar trust for his second wife. He received no payments from the second trust as he did from the first. It was held
here that the trusts were not includible in his gross estate. 35 It
would seem that the estate tax could be avoided completely simply
by picking a trustee who in fact could be trusted and letting him
pay over income at his discretion. Is there really a significant
difference if the trustee is a personal friend, an attorney or the
decedent himself? The reason behind the establishment of a
discretionary trust, which could pay income to the settlor, would
seem to be one of tax avoidance, and under section 2036 it would
seem logical to include this type of trust in the decedent's gross
estate, unless in fact the decedent received no beneficial enjoyment
of the income.
32 Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953); In Te Lueders'
Estate, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
33 Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1944).
34 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945).
35 Contm, Selznick's Estate v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 716, afj'd, 195 F.2d 735 (9th
Cir. 1952).
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In Delaney v. Gardner3 6 the decedent made an inter vivos
transfer of stocks to a family corporation set up to take care of a
family homestead. It was a non-stock corporation, but decedent
was one of a seven-member board who exercised control of the
corporation. While the court found that the decedent did not in
fact exercise dominion over the other members of the board, it
is apparent from the opinion that the decedent's wealth was a large
part of the corporate assets, and it would have been possible to
reconvey the beneficial interest to the decedent by action of the
board (although the transfer was in form irrevocable). Again,
the result seems to be justified by the wording of the statute, but
it might be asked if even the First Circuit is consistent in its
application of section 2036, when one compares Delaney v.
Gardner37 with State Street Trust Co. v. United States. 38 However,
in reviewing all the cases, the result reached in the Delaney case
seems justified since the decedent received no beneficial enjoyment
of the transferred property.39
While the provisions of section 2036 have been leniently
applied in some areas, they have been held to include in the gross
estate most forms of survivorship annuities. 40 An annuity purchased from community property providing for payments to the
husband for his life and then to the wife for her life was held
taxable to the husband's estate.41 The court apparently reasoned
that since the wife had.a much longer life expectancy, such an
annuity transaction was merely a device to avoid the estate tax. A
survivorship annuity bought by two sisters, each paying one half of
the cost is taxable to the estate of the first to die.42 The principal
exception to the includibility of survivorship annuities seems to
have been in the area of pension benefits. In the normal case the
employer sets up an annuity for the employee to begin upon his
retirement. Under most such plans, however, the employee has
the option of electing a smaller annuity payment for himself and
the payment of an annuity after his death to a third person, usually
204 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1953).
Ibid.
ss 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
30 Cf. Estate of Klauber, 34 T.C. 968 (1960).
40 E.g., Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 821
(1942).
41 Commissioner v. Wilder's Estate, 118 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1941).
42 Pruyn's Estate v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1950).
36

37
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his wife, for life. The courts, apparently reasoning that this does
not constitute a "transfer" but rather a relinquishment of part of
a larger right, have held this type of transaction not includible in
the employee's gross estate.43 The same result has been reached in
a case where the employer and the employee both made contributions to the pension fund. 44
The above-described pension plans take property belonging
to the decedent and divide it into present and future interests.
The present interest is retained by the decedent and the future
interest is "transferred" to another person. This arrangement
gives the decedent a beneficial interest in the property which
should be reached if section 2036 is to be consistently applied.
Becklenberg's Estate v. Commissioner45 illustrates the confusion
further. There decedent set up an irrevocable trust out of which
the trustee was to purchase annuities for the decedent, but in the
absence of such annuities, decedent was to be allowed up to
$10,000 per year from the trust. Decedent was paid income and
no annuities were in fact ever purchased. Held, since decedent
could have been paid from principal, this did not constitute a
retention of income. In other cases, the Seventh Circuit has held
that a trust to pay $100 income, with discretion to pay more is
includible in gross income,46 and a survivorship annuity to decedent for life and then to his daughter for her life is also includible.47 It has been argued that these decisions cannot be
reconciled using any "rational basis of estate taxation." 48
Finally section 2036 has been applied to trusts created to satisfy
a legal obligation of the decedent. For example, decedent in the
typical case will establish a trust to pay his wife's support for her
life, remainder over. Since decedent already had the obligation
to support his wife, and if the funds did not come from this trust
he would have to provide them from his other income, the courts
have treated this trust in the same way in which a trust payable
to the decedent for life would be treated. 49 So long as the trust is
48
44

Higg's Estate v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1950).
Commissioner v. Twogood's Estate, 194 F .2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952).
45 273 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1959).
46 In re Uhl's Estate, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957).
47 Forster v. Sauber, 249 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1957).
48 Covey, Section 2036-The New Problem Child of the Federal Estate Tax, 4 TAX
COUNSELOR'S Q. 121 (1960).
49 Helvering v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Co., 111 F.2d 224 (8th Cir.
1940).
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declared to be for the "support and maintenance" of the wife, it
has been held taxable even though in reality the use of the trust
money was for a purpose upon which the decedent was not legally
obligated.110 Trusts used to satisfy obligations arising out of separation agreements present the greatest problems in the application
of section 2036. Where the wife gives up her marital rights, there
is no consideration for the trust, 61 and it has been held includible
in the decedent's gross estate. 112 However, the wife's promise to
support the children has been treated as an adequate consideration
for the trust. 113 When a trust satisfies a legal obligation of the
decedent, it frees other funds for his beneficial enjoyment and
thus is equivalent to a reservation of a beneficial enjoyment in
transferred property.
It is apparent from the previous discussion that section 2036
has been applied to property relationships beyond the reservation
of the life trust. Even though this is not in accord with the
apparent intent of Congress, it perhaps could be justified if the
section were applied equally to all property relationships which are
analogous in substance to the life trust. The obvious fact is that
there is little if any consistency in the section's application. In
Greene v. United States, 114 decedent transferred property to his
daughters, and they agreed to pay him the income for life. The
court held that the interest here created was taxable since it was
analogous to a trust giving decedent the income for life. Compare
this to the treatment of the combination annuity-life insurance
policy which was held not includible in decedent's gross estate,115
and then try to put into section 2036 logically the includibility of a
trust in which decedent merely retained broad management
powers. 116 None of these three cases presents a property interest
which is exactly the life estate intended to be included under
section 2036. But if we are to distinguish between the cases, it
would be logical not to include the last situation in the decedent's
gross estate because it confers no beneficial interest on him.
Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate, 205 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1953).
Commissioner v. Douglass' Estate, 143 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1944); 74 HAR.v. L. REv. 1191
(1961).
112 Chase National Bank v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1955).
53 Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940). Contra, National
Bank of Commerce v. Henslee, 179 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). See generally,
STEPHENS 8c MARR, FEDERAL EsrATE AND GIFr TAXES 75 (1959).
6i 237 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1956).
!SIS Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274 (1958).
56 State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
liO
111
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If a judicial gloss must be put on the statute in spite of the
apparent intent of Congress, at least the courts should apply this
gloss evenly. Until there is some greater degree of consistency in
the application of section 2036, intelligent planning and prediction
become impossible. Because the courts have been unable to give
a consistent application to this statute which has been law since
1932, Congress should take affirmative action and make it clear
to the courts exactly what kinds of property interests are to be
taxed under section 2036.
Even in the absence of congressional action a more definite line
can be drawn between the cases than the ad hoc approach used at
present has developed. If the courts insist upon including within
section 2036 property interests other than the historic life estate
and the life trust, the following test would at least provide a greater
degree of consistency: the property should be included in the
gross estate if the decedent actually enjoys a beneficial interest
therein. In the discussion above of the various property interests
to which section 2036 has been applied, an attempt has been made
to look at each in the light of this test. The test should be a
factual one. If in fact the decedent had actually received beneficial
enjoyment for the period of his life from the property transferred,
such property should be included in his gross estate under section
2036.
The use of this test would separate those cases in which the
decedent retained only managerial benefits from those cases where
he retained actual beneficial enjoyment. Retention of strictly
managerial powers would cause the estate no tax liability, while
the retention of a beneficial interest would cause the tax to be
imposed in every case. Such a test would also be in tune with the
intent of Congress in that it would be taxing beneficial interests
similar in substance, albeit not in form, to the historic life estate.
Until the time that Congress sees fit to give the courts a guide for
their use in the application of section 2036, the beneficial interest
test would give certainty to estate planners in relying upon the
interpretation the courts would give section 2036. This is a
desirable result not only in insuring a decedent the disposition he
wishes to make of his assets, but also in eliminating a good deal of
expensive litigation which results when a court is called on to make
its independent analysis of a particular property arrangement.

William S. Bach, S.Ed.

